THE ECONOMIST: SHOULD FOREIGNERS INTERVENE IN SOMALIA?

FOR: After 20 years, Somalia remains the world's most failed state and recently things have got worse. Thus the motion should not be to stop foreign intervention, but rather to do it better.
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To blame external actors for Somalia's troubles would also ignore how its squabbling, venal, selfish and incompetent leaders have squandered many opportunities to restore some semblance of stability and order. The TFG is only the latest example. It wasted enormous and genuine goodwill by failing to meaningfully reach out and negotiate political deals with clans that control and administer territory. Ministers chosen solely for their clan affiliation failed to deliver those clans. Instead of building alliances with local administrations, the president and most ministers preferred to jet round the world to ask for additional assistance to build capacity and furnish services they are in no position to provide. Protected by AMISOM, the government has even neglected to put its own security in order. Government forces remain badly led and appallingly organised. Because of corruption in both the security services and other ministries, soldiers were not paid or fed. In frustration, the international community has taken over those responsibilities, but not surprisingly many troops have very little loyalty to the government.

The government's disorder is compounded by lack of international unity. The principal international actors—the UN, AU, EU, League of Arab States, the United States and other major donors—do not have a clearly articulate or agreed plan on how to help the TFG and restore order and stability in Somalia. Because of this they lack similar priorities, often do not coordinate their activities and do not speak with one voice. This sends mixed signals to the TFG and allows ministers to pick and choose from separate initiatives.

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There is also no political will for another multi-year peace process. The challenge then is to increase the effectiveness of the TFG and prioritise a political over a security strategy. The TFG can be the nucleus of a much more devolved and federal state that does not threaten other clan interests and local administrations but provides a framework for cooperation and mutual benefit. The international community could and should help shape the incentive structures for this evolution, with visionary and unified leadership and targeted and conditioned assistance.


AGAINST: Foreigners should not intervene in Somalia because international efforts will galvanise the radicals and prolong Somalia's suffering.
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The international community can help them in two ways. First, the United States and Europe must, immediately, restore funding for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Food relief may indeed be providing a marginal source of funding to Al-Shabaab, but it is a lifeline to some 3.4m desperate people, and the single visible signpost that the West cares at all about the suffering in Somalia. The decision to cut off most aid will cost lives and will radicalise the population against us. Second, the United States should continue to launch strategic counter-terror strikes against foreign terrorist targets in Somalia. The September 2009 strike against an Al-Qaeda operative, Saleh Ali Nabhan, is a perfect model. Conducted in a remote rural location without civilian casualties, it stirred not a hint of public protest. It is a firm clue that the locals do not object to sensible international assistance in ridding Somalia of foreign parasites attempting to exploit the country's conflict—as long as the innocent aren't caught up in the crossfire.

FOR MORE: http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/529